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How can the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” be 
reconciled in international law? 
 
 
Janet Furness 
 
 
Abstract 
This article will consider the ways in which the role of humanitarian intervention, 
which currently does not have any clear legal status, can be defended through 
international law. Using both realist and liberal cosmopolitan theoretical 
approaches, it will consider three notions of legitimacy to argue that humanitarian 
intervention can be justified – that is: Legitimacy through humanitarian crises; 
humanitarian intervention supported through a creative interpretation and 
application of general principles of international law; and humanitarian intervention 
justified by morality and “natural law.” It will consider the use of force that has taken 
place in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya as case-studies and examples. A broader sense 
of legality will be argued to reconcile the notion that humanitarian intervention could 
be legalised- however, a restrictive factor remains with the horizontal rather than 
vertical nature of international law that requires the will of States. Thus the next best 
alternative will be considered. 
 
 
 
Humanitarian intervention both before and after the adoption of the UN Charter has 
not gained the status of established international law to justify the use of force. From a pure 
legalist perspective, it is not permitted action. Nevertheless, there is support for the 
concept.1 In the present day, one might assume that the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes is still subject to each state’s understanding of a situation. Therefore, it is 
important to consider the legitimacy of “non-legal” action.  
To consider any use of force as legitimate it must be perceived by other states as 
legitimate,2 therefore it must be widely accepted as appropriate conduct. Usually, a state 
embarking upon the use of armed force will search widely for a legal justification, even if the 
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argument is weak, in order to find support for the action. In Iraq (2003), the coalition sought 
to base their action on the ‘legality’ of UNSC-adopted Resolutions. In Afghanistan (2001), 
the USA based their argument on the ‘legality’ of self-defence. 
Council inaction has been also been suggested as an argument for “non-legal” intervention.3 
If the maintainer of peace and security fails to do its job, then a state may be justified from a 
realistic and practical point of view in taking unilateral steps. Nevertheless, it is still not 
strictly ‘legal’ and thus, potentially ‘illegal’ under international law. 
It could be argued that the failure of the UNSC to condemn what is, when viewed from a 
strictly positivist standpoint, ‘illegal’ action (such as that in Kosovo (1998-9)) gives it some 
legal status with possible precedent value.4 If this is so, then the UNSC could authorise the 
use of force retroactively, including armed force, as long as it is within the spirit of the 
Resolution.5 However, this view is problematic because it undermines the rule of law. In 
order to follow the law, one must know what that rule is at the time the transgression takes 
place. If this were not the case, then it would be impossible to know what the law was at 
any particular point in time, and therefore impossible to know if one was avoiding 
transgression. Moreover, not condemning a use of force is not necessarily the same as 
condoning it or making it legal. Perhaps a more suitable solution is that such use of force is 
‘tolerated.’6 Legalists would not recognise any retroactive legality and would not consider 
legitimacy as a viable alternative. It would require a form of law to set aside the UN 
Charter.7 However, from a realist and, even more so, a cosmopolitan perspective, there may 
be some broader justifications or legitimate reasons for engaging in strictly illegal uses of 
force.  
Nevertheless, these arguments are legality in a broader sense. They do not always conform 
to a strict sense of legality or legalist theory. Kohen even suggests that US policies were not 
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concerned with strict legality.8 If this were so, then even legitimacy would be a weak 
argument if the reason for intervention were purely of nationalistic interests. Nevertheless, 
the USA and any state engaging in the use of force should be required to justify its decision 
to the world community of states, including the UN. Therefore, whether legal or not, there 
will have to be a reason for each specific use of force. 
The following considers various conceptions and models of legitimacy that could potentially 
provide a justification for the use of humanitarian intervention that has not yet gained the 
status of international law per se. 
Legitimacy through humanitarian crises – justifications for legalising the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention 
Perhaps the most outstanding justification for the adoption of humanitarian 
intervention as a clear doctrine in international law is the notion of humanitarian 
intervention itself: the prevention of humanitarian catastrophes. 
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan cautioned against placing a strict proviso on 
legality in cases of humanitarian crises.9 Regarding Rwanda, he asked the General Assembly 
in 1999:  
‘if, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had 
been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council 
authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?’10 
 This is a clear example that an overwhelming obligation to forestall a humanitarian 
catastrophe should outweigh any specific legal rule to the contrary. What is interesting, 
however, is that no country offered support to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, thus 
highlighting a problematic side of the doctrine. Without a clear legal doctrine, there is no 
identification of the point in time when states should intervene. This leads to further 
questions about the ‘amount’ of suffering, which must be present. Could the doctrine be 
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invoked to help ten citizens, or 100, or 1000, or more? This question would need to be 
clarified if the doctrine were to be adopted. 
In Yugoslavia v Belgium et al,11 Belgium argued that every state has a duty to intervene to 
prevent human disasters, and therefore every state must have a right to do so. Arguably, 
this is logical in that, if states are obliged to prevent human disasters, then it follows that 
they must have the corresponding right to enter a country with armed force to prevent such 
disasters. However, the solution to the extent of the catastrophe, as above, is still not 
answered. Exactly how many citizens need to be in danger for the use of force to be legal? 
There is no right answer, and one could argue that one life is enough. However, the risks to 
the interveners must also be assessed as part of the answer. This can only be done on a 
case-by-case basis. Furthermore, if every state has a duty to intervene, why was there no 
intervention in Rwanda? This only adds to the uncertainty concerning the current doctrine 
as it stands, without a clear adoption in international law. 
Fletcher and Ohlin ask, ‘[i]s the humanitarian crisis legally sufficient to justify a violation of 
another state’s territorial integrity on the basis of defense of others.’12 The wording is 
different to the title of this article - but the idea is the same. Is the crisis ‘enough’ to warrant 
invading another state’s territory? This question requires a clear answer, which at present 
international law is unable to give. 
It is possible that subsequent State practice could result in a new interpretation of the 
Charter provisions that would permit intervention for humanitarian grounds or through the 
emergence of a new customary rule. This would require the general practice of States to be 
that of intervention when faced with humanitarian crises, and that States accept it as law.13 
It is possible that the second element might fail, as states may not want to be bound by such 
a law. However, if they do choose to accept it; the ‘reinterpretation’ might, for example, 
require the reference to territorial integrity and political independence in Art. 2(4) to be 
                                                 
11
 CR 99/14 (May 10, 1999). 
12
 George P Fletcher & Jens D Ohlin, Defending Humanity – When Force is Justified and Why (Oxford University Press 2008) 69. 
13
 Statute of the International Court of Justice: Article 38(1)(b) "evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” 
  
read narrowly.14 For a new customary rule to emerge, it  would require the status of jus 
cogens as it would need to match the status of the prohibition on the use of force.15 
Presently, State practice fluctuates; humanitarian reasons are invoked but usually alongside 
another justification such as self-defence or UNSC authorisation.16 This is because States are 
reluctant to establish a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as with the example of 
Rwanda, and intervention might then not only be permitted, ‘but a state’s failure to 
intervene might violate its international responsibilities.’17 Yugoslavia v Belgium et al would 
suggest that states already have a duty to intervene, but this has not been enforced.  If a 
state does not want to engage in a use of force and is compelled to act, it might not 
undertake the use of force as effectively as if it had chosen to act.  Nevertheless, it would 
still have to comply with international law obligations compelling it to take responsibility for 
the situation. This would be a positive step, as opposed to no action at all. 
The principle here is that for humanitarian intervention not to receive criticism, it 
must be applied consistently. Since States can use humanitarian reasons but intervene for 
other ‘state’ related policies, is the use of force an answer to a desperate humanitarian 
situation? It could be assumed that presently, States decide independently on a case-by-
case basis when to intervene with an armed force. However, what is required is a universal 
application, regardless of state politics. This would ensure that arguments proposed for the 
intervention are not self-serving. Therefore, the best possible answer is a defined doctrine, 
where at least an element of motivation must be humanitarian and which permits States to 
act if they so wish but does not necessitate they must. 
Humanitarian Intervention supported through a creative interpretation and application of 
general principles of international law 
This model of legitimacy is synonymous to “the mischief rule” in the domestic UK law 
of statutory interpretation. It would argue that, although there is no specific and applicable 
legal rule to support this kind of use of force, state practice in the area is consistent with this 
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kind of intervention.  Those uses of force that were within the “spirit” of international law, 
as opposed to the actual “letter of the law,” would fit well here as well.  
The idea of an international law based upon general principles of international regulation, 
developed and applied by states, is a liberal cosmopolitan idea developed by Ronald 
Dworkin. International law, in this sense, is not reducible to a system or series of technical 
rules.18 Dworkin held the view that, if decisions are compatible with such principles of law, 
or at least with their implications, then they can be legitimate, even where detailed rules or 
precedents do not directly support them. Dworkin considers the political legitimacy of 
states as key. He accepts that the domestic policies of states can affect international law 
and relations. However, his theory has been criticised as ‘ignor[ing] the crosscutting 
obligations that domestic political demands put on states and the potential that democratic 
political processes have to use international law as an instrument of change.’19  
Too strict an interpretation of the UN Charter could also lead to a lawful non-
intervention but one that does nothing to advance the role of international law. Kosovo 
could be an example of when the prohibition on unilateral uses of force seemed to be a case 
of good law producing bad results. In order to prevent this absurdity one could look to the 
creative judicial deployments of the Martens Clause. The clause was introduced in the 
preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II on the Laws and Customs of War on Land.20 
Unfortunately, there is no accepted interpretation of the Martens Clause—it was originally 
designed to provide residual humanitarian rules.21 In its most restricted interpretation, the 
Clause serves as a reminder that customary international law continues to apply after the 
adoption of a treaty norm. A wider interpretation is that it provides for something which is 
not explicitly prohibited by a treaty (that is, is not ipso facto permitted). The widest 
interpretation is that conduct in armed conflicts is not only judged according to treaties and 
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custom, but also to the principles of international law referred to by the Clause.22 ‘Where 
there already is some legal basis for adopting a more humanitarian position, the Martens 
Clause enables decision makers to take the extra step forward.’23 
Taking the Martens Clause notion of legitimacy at its widest interpretation, the use of force 
in Iraq in the 1990’s could fit here. The failure of Iraq to comply with the disarmament 
conditions of Resolution 687 could provide a reason to engage in armed force under the 
grounds of humanitarian intervention. If Iraq was clear in not wanting to disarm, then it 
could be assumed it had the intentions to use such weapons, resulting in risks to the civilian 
population.  
In Iraq in 2003, the belief that WMD posed a real threat could lead to a rational use of the 
Clause again on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, if customary action 
were still to apply after the adoption of a treaty, then the role of anticipatory self-defence 
would also be a justified and hence a legitimate explanation. 
 In Libya, the use of force to remove Gaddaffi would certainly be met by reasons of 
humanitarian intervention and public conscience. In the first instance, it can be argued that 
it was morally right to remove the dictator to enable a safe regime to be put in place. As the 
use of force in Libya was most certainly within the ‘spirit’ of Resolution 1973, it is perhaps 
the easiest to regard as legitimate. 
Humanitarian Intervention justified by morality and “natural law” 
Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations states: ‘the members of the League 
reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice.’ This is a broad and perhaps unlimited standard, 
permitting the use of force based on state’s individual interpretations of what is just and 
right.24 
Moral legitimacy has no real legal basis in international law. It is concerned with 
philosophical ideals. ‘Realists [would] question the basic premise that morality has anything 
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to do with military engagement in the first place and they question that this type of 
intervention in another state’s affairs contravenes the notion of independent statehood.’25  
The famous example is that, it is morally right for one to save a drowning baby from the 
lake, but it is not a legal requirement. This concept can be transposed to the humanitarian 
intervention argument. Perhaps it is morally right for states to intervene to prevent 
humanitarian disasters, but who decides that the situation is severe enough that 
intervention is required? In some cases it might be obvious, but some might be marginal. 
Where should the line be drawn in interfering with a state’s sovereignty? Without 
boundaries, the ‘slippery slope’ argument becomes a reality. It is this argument by which ‘ad 
hoc mitigation rather than principled exception’26 would seek to address. 
It has been suggested that there are three broad categories that could be used to morally 
justify military engagement: response to “aggression,” a pre-emptive strike against 
imminent or likely aggression, and a response to the threats against the lives and well-being 
of citizens of other states.27 Nevertheless, these responses should be subject to 
proportionality and the long term and wide ranging consequences of initiating conflict.28 It 
could be argued that the armed force used against Afghanistan in 2001 was to protect the 
lives of citizens; it could also be described as a response to aggression. If the findings of 
WMD had been correct, then the invasion of Iraq in 2003 could have fallen within the 
category of imminent or likely aggression. One could assume that such use of force would 
be “proportionate,” i.e., a response to terrorism and dangerous weapons. However, the 
consequences of initiating action could be more problematic. It would be an appropriate 
conclusion that neither Iraq nor Afghanistan are “safe” countries after the invasions, and 
civilian casualties in Iraq are estimated to have reached somewhere between 127,789 and 
143,066.29 As of February 2014, at least 21,000 civilians are estimated to have died violent 
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deaths as a result of the war in Afghanistan. 30 The long-term effect of action in these 
countries might not seem proportionate to moral arguments to use force. 
Furthermore, ‘Although moral arguments may be successful in the court of world opinion, 
one cannot walk into the Security Council conceding that a course of action violates 
international law and expect to prevail.’31 It is clear that morality is not law. 
Natural law theory is based on concepts of right and justice.32 Historically, so long as 
a war was considered ‘just’, a country was entitled to pursue it.  This is an old theory, which 
died out in the 15th and 16th centuries, but was revived in 1919, and with the Versailles 
Peace Treaty there has been a return to this line of thought with the emergence of crimes 
against humanity and crimes of aggression.33 
Walzer argues that ‘morality, at least, is not a bar to unilateral action, so long as there is no 
immediate alternative available.’34 This statement seems sensible in theory, but in practice, 
it is unworkable because it raises again the question: whose moral values and standards? 
Who judges that there is not a suitable alternative? The answers must come from states 
themselves, as they are the makers and enforcers of international law and relations, but if 
humanitarian intervention is based on what is just and right, it would be possible for weaker 
states to have a dominant majority enforced upon them—particularly when linked to state’s 
individual interests.   
In order to win support, the U.S invasion of Iraq needed to be identified as a “just 
war.”35 Saddam Hussein was targeted, independently conforming to the notion of 
discrimination prevalent in just-war theory.36 Still, a war can only be ‘just’ if the claims in 
relation to it are truthful. Furthermore, Falah et al suggests that: ‘Domestically, failure in 
war undercuts the authority of political elites.’37 Therefore, once a hegemonic state has 
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engaged in warfare, there is pressure to continue with that act, even if arguments to the 
contrary appear. For example, the U.S and other nations claimed there was reason to 
believe Iraq had in its possession weapons of mass destruction, but later evidence 
suggested that this argument was incorrect, yet the use of force in the country continued. 
The continued use of force in Iraq was arguably based on broadly defeating terrorism and 
Iraq’s blatant non-compliance with UNSC Resolutions. 
Gilpin suggests that the US has engaged in the use of force to “transform” Islamic nations in 
their war against terror.38 It could be argued that this goes against the UN Charter Article 
2(7) and the preservation of state sovereignty. If this is correct, then how far can ‘moral 
legitimacy’ be taken? If armed force is taken in pursuit of such aims, then the claims of a 
moral justification are weak if there is no immediate threat to civilians. However, this 
particular interpretation of the Bush regime could be criticised as being anti-American. It 
could be argued that the US are trying to achieve global democracy and peace from 
terrorism, rather than specifically “transforming” all Islamic nations. 
In R v Jones and others,39 at para. 37, Lord Hoffman discusses the legal status of the 2003 
Iraqi war: ‘Many people thought that it was morally wrong and contrary to international 
law’  and ‘[o]thers thought that it was justified, necessary and lawful.’ This is an example of 
the deep-rooted problems with moral legitimacy. States will likely act on their own moral 
values, which may or may not be universal. Additionally states that are “more democratic” 
would likely claim a right to intervene in oppressive regimes.40 This would then affect the 
fundamental principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force.41  
Natural law theory and moral legitimacy have the broadest interpretation of 
international law. At present, these are not legal doctrines in a strict sense, however 
sensible the theory may be. Cosmopolitan theory is the closest to natural law rights, arguing 
that there can be a higher category of law protecting universal rights.  If the doctrine of ‘just 
war’, morality, and natural law rights were to be adopted as a part of international law, the 
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use of force would be permitted because it is right. This encompasses, by default, all uses of 
force related to humanitarian intervention. It would be unclear where the use of force ‘for 
the greater good’ would be prohibited. In this scenario, it would be important to have a set 
of guidelines, for without guidance the breadth of any use of force would be vast.  
If moral theory of the use of force were to become a legal doctrine, it would address 
when to act, when not to act, and how to act.42 Yet the breadth of moral interpretations 
would ensure difficulties in coming to an exact agreement on these issues. Furthermore, it 
goes beyond an ‘authorisation’ to act to demanding action. Although some crises may be 
obscene, a forced action is not always likely to produce the best results. Therefore, the 
contemporary world is unlikely to see an emergence of a moral obligation to act. 
Conclusion 
Evidence suggests that the UNSC is often incapable of dealing with humanitarian issues. 
‘The Security Council did not intervene in Rwanda where over one million helpless people 
were killed, it did very little to confront the Bosnian Serbs during the first three to five years 
of the Balkan’s war, and it refuses to address the conflicts occurring in Liberia or 
Chechnya.’43 With this in mind, it is easy to see why states may take matters into their own 
hands when faced with this type of situation. 
As this article identifies, there are some theories of international law that could be used to 
justify the use of force for humanitarian purposes. Nevertheless, underlying these theories 
is the problem that even if the use of force could be justified, the infringement or 
transgression of the rule prohibiting the use of force remains intact.44 Thus. none of the 
justifications discussed would satisfy a legalist. The use of force is still “illegal”. This 
“illegality” would not, however, worry a sophisticated realist, who would argue that ‘in 
international politics states can always find a justification for their actions because the rules 
are sufficiently indeterminate.’45 Therefore, it is arguable that international law should be 
developed in this area to meet the current climate and prevent “illegal”—but necessary for 
humanitarian purposes—action from taking place. On the other hand, if broadened, the 
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realms of international law could be further stretched by states seeking additional rights to 
intervene, or, furthermore, exceed the “new” law? The answer to this possible consequence 
is not clear, but worth considering. 
Any exacerbation or exploitation of international law would weaken its role, and once it is 
weakened, less justifiable uses of force may appear.46 Importantly, for custom to ‘change’ 
the law, it must, in some cases, break the law; what truly matters is state practice. If state 
practice is consistent and coherent, and without a world court to deliver justice for a 
technical breach, it is unwise to label uses of force as illegal. Such a label questions the use 
of force, which if used for one of the circumstances detailed above, has at least some 
credibility. The use of force should only be questioned when it is sheer aggression, and in 
such an event is likely to quickly receive counter-force by an intervening state. It is those 
states who make international law, apply international law, and show respect for 
international law. Therefore, if the use of armed force is widely agreed-upon, it cannot be 
inherently illegal. ‘International law does not exist in the abstract; rather it is what states 
make of it.’47 It is pertinent to note that state politics may, and likely will, coincide with any 
explanation for armed force, but should not be the sole reason for intervention. 
The Martens Clause is a useful tool to make sense of international law in addressing this 
issue. It would be absurd for a state, which could intervene to sit by and watch mass 
genocide or similar disasters to continue. This is a principle which works effectively in 
domestic law; the problem of the principle is the lack of a world court to provide 
jurisdiction. In practice, perhaps it is one of the best options available: restrictive enough to 
prevent the floodgates of unilateral action being taken, whilst recognising the acceptability 
of the use of force in certain cases. 
Humanitarian intervention could have a legitimate claim through the role of custom and 
increasing state practice. If state practice were to be consistent, then it would be safe to 
assume that it is legitimate and a clear legal action. 
Action taken outside the UN Charter is clearly a breach of sovereignty. However, it is 
questionable whether sovereignty should be restricted in cases of clear humanitarian crises. 
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 George P Fletcher & Jens D Ohlin, Defending Humanity – When Force is Justified and Why (Oxford University Press 2008) 134. 
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 Oliver Corten, ‘The Controversies Over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate’ [2006] 16 European 
Journal of International Law 803-822. 
  
It is likely the moral argument in support of intervention to prevent human suffering will 
always be greater. What is troublesome is the clear “illegal” nature of what could be termed 
moral action. If states wish a certain morality to be a part of international law, then they 
need to incorporate it into international doctrine in order to mitigate the argument of illegal 
but moral action.  
 
‘The ‘illegal but justified’ approach seeks to have the best of both worlds where the action is 
justified under act-utilitarianism, but the rule is justified under rule-utilitarianism.’48 In 
practice, states can use force ‘illegally’ without sanction, but the ‘illegality’ of the use of 
force prevents an exacerbation of the rule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 A Roberts, ‘Legality vs. Legitimacy: Can Uses of Force Be Illegal But Justified?’ in P Alston and E Macdonald (eds), Human Rights, 
Intervention, and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press 2008) 204. 
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